Sexual and Social Mobility in
The real subject is not primarily sexual lewdness at all, but "social lewdness" mythically expressed in sexual 
I. Sexual Mobility
During the last fifty years anthropologists have developed an extensive body of theory about incest. Debate continues on many issues: origin versus structure and function, incest and exogamy (sexual versus marriage regulation), and animal versus human social behavior.' Still, a basic outline is now visible. A narrowly psychologicalthat is to say, universal-explanation of incest (via, for instance, "instinctive repulsion") is The Duchess ofMalfi stymied by the diverse data available from nonWestern cultures. Jack Goody has found considerable variation in the object of the defining "horror" that incest supposedly "inevitably arouses."
Sometimes intercourse with blood relatives arouses the repulsion; on other occasions only relatives by marriage are forbidden (32, (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) 46) . Moreover, as Kenneth Burke notes, "psychoanalysis too often conceals . . . the nature of exclusive social relations behind inclusive [i.e., universal] terms for sexual relations" (Rhetoric 279-80).2 A vocabulary of "human nature" obscures crucial variations specific to different social formations. To deal with such variations, we need to reconceive such "givens" of human psychology as social products.
Anthropologists propose two general sets of social explanation for the incest taboo: arguments from factors internal to the nuclear family (such as competition among males for females) and from factors external to it. The latter argument, from the larger social situation, fits neatly with Webster's play. It specifies, in Talcott Parsons's words, that it is not so much the prohibition of incest in its negative aspect which is important as the positive obligation to perform functions for the subunit and the larger society by marrying out. Incest is a withdrawal from this obligation to contribute to the formulation and maintenance of supra-familial bonds on which major economic, political and religious functions of the society are dependent. (19)3 This notion of public determination of private social structure is quite flexible, as Raymond Firth noted long ago:
This powerful account also explains exceptions to the rule, such as those of ancient Egypt or Hawaii (and, as we will see, exceptions of individual inclination such as Ferdinand's). "Where interest of rank or property steps in," says Firth, "the incest prohibition is likely to melt away" (304).4 Both the taboo and its infringements are thus seen as social products, similarly determined by the pressures and limits of particular social formations.
The model thus far presented is derived from traditional societies, where intermarriage is the most important device for ordering "the interpenetration of memberships among the different elements in the structural network" (Parsons 18 ). Jacobean England, though much more differentiated in many ways, exhibits many of the structural relations of such a traditional society.
Lawrence Stone judges that "in the sixteenth century, kin groupings remained powerful in politics, [and] much of the political in-fighting of the century revolved around certain kinship rivalries. ... In local affairs, kin ties undoubtedly continue to be important well into the eighteenth century" (Family 126, 128) .5 Aberle and his colleagues generalize the notion:
For the bulk of pre-industrial complex societies, the functions of the incest taboo in its extended form remain important at the community level. There, the regulation of affairs is not impersonal and legal. . . . The nexus of social life and cooperation continues to be based on kinship to a significant degree, until societies with well-developed market-economies appear. (18) The politics of kinship thus continued in importance among the hereditary aristocracy throughout the Jacobean period.
With the development of a differentiated class structure there arises a new sort of pressure that, contrary to the pressure in traditional societies toward intermarriage, tends to limit exogamy. In moving from traditional toward differentiated structure, Jacobean England was marked by this new constraint. Among other ideological pressures, Stone says, the custom of the dowry, according to which brides from all ranks of the propertied classes were expected to contribute a cash sum, together with the great sensitivity to status and rank, meant that there was a very high degree of social and economic endogamy [i.e., required marriage within the group, here defined in terms of class]. Since marriage involved an exchange of cash by the father of the bride for the settlement of property by the father of the groom for the maintenance of the couple and a pension for the widow, it was inevitable that the great majority of marriages should take place between spouses from families with similar economic resources .... The fact that most [elite] families aspired to maintain status and enlarge connections through marriage meant that in most cases like would marry like. These limits to intermarriage were further stressed in aristocratic consciousness by a gradual contamination of the ruling elite by invasion from below-a process that Stone has described in The Crisis of the Aristocracy. Although the elite responded with hegemonic contempt to most of these penetrations, widespread public fascination testifies to the issue's continuing potency. Castiglione's Book of the Courtier was functionally a prolonged sneer at what Thomas Hoby translates as those "many untowardly Asseheades, that through malapartnesse thinke to purchase them the name of a good Courtier" (29).6 And Shakespeare explores the problem repeatedly, from Bottom to Bassanio and Edmund and Othello. This problem of ontological mobility, or mobility of identity, is palpably at the center of the cultural consciousness, certainly in London, nowhere more than in the theater, where I believe it shaped depictions of sexual and marital patterns. In The Duchess of Malfi in particular, the class-endogamy pressure assigns to licit marriage an outer frontier, which the duchess trespasses, just as the incest taboo marks the inner wilderness, where Ferdinand longs to dwell.7 But to grasp the significance of these symmetrical vectors of social force, we must mark the details of the play.
First, though, a glance at the history of critical opinion about Ferdinand's incestuous desires.
F. L. Lucas first addressed the possibility, though he thought it dubious (2: 23-24); Clifford Leech presented the view fully, in John Webster (100-06). Leech's argument occasioned resistance, from, for instance, J. R. Mulryne, as implying too readily "the desire to consummate the passion" (223). In response Leech itemized his evidence in Webster:
The grossness of his language to her in Act I, the continued violence of his response to the situation, his holding back from identifying her husband and, when that identity is established, from killing him until the -time" [3.3.72-74] .) This anger specifies cross-class rivalry, and the debasement by occupation marks the intensity of the aversion.'2 For him invaders are mere laborers, well-equipped with poles and bars, false, and potent; by coupling with the duchess they couple with him and contaminate him, taking his place. He desires exclusiveness, which he pursues not by intercourse but This formulation deciphers another recalcitrant fact. Firth notes that "in general the harmony of group interests is maintained" by the taboo; "the 'horror of incest' then falls into place as one of those supernatural sanctions, the aura of which gives weight to so many useful social attitudes."
But sometimes the reverse is true: "Where [group interests] demand it for the preservation of their privileges, the union permitted between kin may be the closest possible" (340). If Ferdinand's incestuous impulse is determined by class paranoia, then he might well feel a cognate but reversed horror for the outmarriage that contravenes what he needs to believe about social absolutes. Firth frames just this affective reversal in terms of racial rather than class outmarriage.
The attitude toward incest has something in common with a popular, uninformed view about union of the sexes in the "colour problem." Here one meets with a comparable repugnance to the idea, the same tendency to put the objection on a "natural" or "instinctive" foundation. Close family sentiment is even invoked as the clinching argument in favor of the impossibility of the admission of such unions-in the well-known formula, "Would you like to see your sister marry...." . . . Here, as in the case of the prohibition of the union of very close kin, is an irrational emotional attitude, developing from a set of powerful complex social institutions. (341) Hamlet is horrified that his own mother would "post with such dexterity to incestuous sheets." Ferdinand's horror is equally aroused by posting and dexterity, but instead of incest the referent is the duchess's horrifying outmarriage.'4
Her action is also threatening to Ferdinand because it suggests that the supposedly ontological class categories are brittle and imperiled by the powers of flexible self-determination exhibited by the duchess and her base lover. Such rewriting of the rules threatens to reveal the human origin, and thus the mutability, of the ultimate elevation on which he rests himself. He cannot tolerate the suggestion, and its source makes it even more frightening-one of his own kind become heretic, apostate. His cruel execution of the duchess may thus have several overlapping motives. To destroy her is to destroy the necessarily potent source of doubt, and the process of destruction reconstitutes them both: she is now the felon, the outlaw; he the transcendent judge. His imprisonment of her reisolates her, puts her in her place, and so restores her status as untouchable, in a private realm that only he can enter. And if her murder counts as a kind of rape, a consummate possessing, he typically employs an agent, a debased and dehumanized prosthesis used teasingly, like the dead man's hand. So he maintains the style of alienation we have seen on the bench (or, for that matter, in the voyeuristic boudoir scene). Such devices allow his forbidden conduct wihile punishing hers, and then allow him to deny his implication in them. This final evasion is couched in revealing terms, for he returns to the issue of disparity in rank when in- This usurping investment in denial can only be maintained by increasingly radical devotion to the task, a surgical practice degenerating toward ultimate alienation: the solipsism of insanity.'5 Ferdinand had already long contracted his ground of being to the two of them; when he sees that he has accomplished his revenge for her divisive betrayal, he reveals (at 4.2.267) the striking fact that they are (were) twins, restoring a lost unity between them even as her death makes him singular. The enormous condensation at work here may be partially untwisted with the aid of Pausanias's alternative version of the Narcissus fable (the Ovidian version having been pertinent all along).
Narcissus in fact had a beloved twin sister.
Upon her death, he is said to have come to a fountain alone, and suffering from desire, gazed upon his own image there. But although that seemed somewhat of a solace, he at length perished with great desire, or, as is more pleasing to others, threw himself into the fountain and perished.16
When Ferdinand looks down into his dead sister's dazzling eyes, he sees himself, faces his own death too.'7 The circle shrinks again, becoming more and more rapidly only his own. When asked why he is so solitary, he replies that the noble eagle flies alone: "they are crows, daws, and starlings that flock together" (5.2.30-31). Next he tries to divest himself of his shadow, attacking even this inherent multiplicity (5.2.31-41). His lycanthropia, unitary wolf at last, brings him to his logical end in total isolation. Walled in alone, not in a secret garden but in an inward hair shirt,'8 he is finally sui generis, a peerless class of one-an entropic apotheosis of the superb Renaissance hero.
Webster presents the duchess in terms precisely symmetrical to her brother's hypertrophy of will.
Ferdinand, as we have seen, is pathologically endogamous, investing his energies much farther inward toward the nuclear core than is normatively fitting. His paranoia digs an ontological moat around itself. In contrast, the duchess is excessively exogamous: fettered in Ferdinand's enclosure, she seizes self-definition by reaching out not only past the interdicted purity of her family but beyond the frontiers of her class, to marry her ad- The apostrophe, the amplification of the hostile odds, the abjection of the enemy, the soldierly comparison, the imperative call for historical (if female) witness-all are heroic topoi. They seem to me to preclude the impoverished interpretive option of the "lustful widow," husbandless and an exceptionally focused specimen of the type: she is not given any of the divided loyalties that would accompany the usual suitor of her own (though Delio is structurally available). But neither is there any sign of degradation in her service, of the sense of self-waste that marks characters who are more modern and more problematic. She seems happily to derive almost the whole of her identity from her relational dedication and so to exhibit for purposes of contrast one familiar form of female selfgift for the duchess to transcend.26
This casting, however, must not be seen as merely negative and limited. For in the Renaissance the private company of women often seems to constitute a secret space in the midst of male society, a haven where the normal modes of subjection are canceled and where a version of traditionally male substantiality is annexed-what we might now hope to call human intimacy. Cariola relates to the duchess as Kent to Lear (though without the devotional power supposedly conferred by noble rank). She occupies the old mode of identity in service with its hierarchical origins, yet she also embodies the collusive strength that female identity can acquire in an oppressively rolerestricted society. But though Cariola unquestioningly aids in the duchess's self-defining act, she also ends the scene with choric doubt about the potential for such female self-determination in the two-gender world: "Whether the spirit of greatness, or of woman / Reign most in her, I know not, but it shows / A fearful madness" (1.1.504-06).
Self-giving will of another sort, practiced by Julia, deflects the judgmental charge of lasciviousness away from the duchess. Wife of old Castruchio and mistress of the cardinal, she acts out the Renaissance court strumpet, male-begot, so that the duchess can be seen as freeing herself from such male imperatives. Julia contrasts with the duchess insofar as the duchess's project does not aim at self-subjecting relational identity but itself founds substantial identity in the normatively masculine sense. Julia reaches out to two sources of power in the play, the cardinal and Bosola, advertising in departure her husband's superannuated weakness and so catering to a male model of woman as yardstick of masculine worth.
She who rejects the ties of marriage attests to the lover's power to draw a woman's heart even against the oppressive double-standard rules of male-dominated society. She demonstrates not her own power of self-determination but his power over her. The courtly adulteress is especially drawn to power, to men who can, by conferring erotic relation, make their women significant or safe. By rejecting her decrepit husband Julia also testifies to her ruthless erotic vigor and so makes herself especially alluring to such men. But her achievement is finally self-wasting: Bosola merely employs her, and the cardinal tires of her and kills her. When she offers herself as a toy, she initiates her own consumption and disposal. Ironically, the cardinal murders her for her "hubristic" attempt to be a peer, a helpmate in a heightened sense, to share in cerebral relation rather than merely physical. Julia's ultimate goals are partly congruent with the duchess's, since both women seek personal security in a hostile male world, but the means Julia chooses inevitably subject her to men who define her as pastime, as furlough from the business of negotium-the terms in which she offers herself to them.
Like Julia, the duchess is forward in her wooing, but she moves delicately within the proper code of her social superiority to Antonio. As has often been observed, however, she uses this power to cancel itself, stripping herself of superiority in order to invent a private parity that they can occupy together. To see this act as a grave "moral infraction" is to assent far too easily to a passive conservatism I doubt Webster sought. But it is certainly a social infraction, and Antonio's wariness is, I believe, a response to that fact.
Ambition, madam, is a great man's madness, That is not kept in chains, and close-pent rooms, But in fair lightsome lodgings, and is girt With the wild noise of prattling visitants, Which makes it lunatic, beyond all cureConceive not I am so stupid but I aim Whereto your favors tend: but he's a fool That, being a-cold, would thrust his hands i'th'fire To warm them. (1.1. The elevation Antonio would reap from this alliance, however disguised, might easily be seen as the goal of his ambition, as Delio later thinks (2.4.80-81). But I think it more likely, in view of the allusions to her tortures in act 4, that the duchess's arrogation of masculine sexual self-determination marks her aspiring mind, a self-projection very complexly viewed by the playwright. The duchess's goal is what we now perceive as a marital norm; as such, it may seem too domestic to count as disruptive social mobility. But such a goal was notably newfangled for the English aristocracy at this time, according to . Issues of female self-determination and mobility across class lines, both social and sexual, had of late come to be commonplace in nurturant family; in any case, in Jacobean society it serves mainly as an ideological pacifier. The duchess tries to reclaim it for familial privacy, with her forcible embrace: "All discord, without this circumference, / Is only to be pitied, and not fear'd" (1.1.469-70). She refers, ironically, to her brothers: she tries to banish old relations from the sphere of the new. But her power is limited, the marriage depressingly short-lived. Though three children are born, they arrive between acts (save for the first child, who vanishes behind the horoscope intrigue). Our sense of husband and wife living in peace together derives chiefly from the scene in which that life ends (3.2). Their small talk before Ferdinand appears suggests just the sort of deep and fruitful ease so lacking elsewhere in the play. (We do not see the children here; our impression of the nuclear family comes largely from the duchess's lines about syrup for the son's cold.) But even their boudoir banter addresses (perhaps as usual?) the relationship's foundation in female power, and ironies abound. For instance, Antonio says he rises early after a night with his wife because he is glad his wearisome night's work is over. The affectionate inversion displaces the real reason for early rising: the oppressive need for secrecy, typical of adultery rather than of marriage. Lightheartedness is simultaneously present and painfully absent. When Ferdinand's eerie appearance disrupts the scene (and allows the duke a taste of substitution), the duchess enters a new isolation prefatory to tragedy. Her response to her brother's erect dagger takes a desperately agile variety of forms: she claims that she can die like a prince; she argues rationalistically (and falsely) that she did not set out to make "any new world, or custom" in marrying; she claims that he is too strict, that her reputation is safe, that she has a right to a future unwidowed. But all her claims fall on deaf, clenched Ferdinand as mere self-justification. Her rational mode of interaction between equals is doomed here, for the urge to parity is the source of the general problem for Ferdinand. When she realizes this she flies without further question.
The tenure of her flight is as truncated in dramatic time as the marriage is. But now as then, the duchess pauses to contemplate the larger significance of her actions, envying the birds of the field, who may marry without restriction;27 wondering whether her brothers' tyranny is a form of God's will, considering that "nought made [her] e'er / Go right but heaven's scourge-stick" (3.5.80-81); fearing and yet hoping that she is, like the salmon, higher in value when nearer the fire. These metaphysical maneuvers are her psychic defense in the face of capture by Bosola: she strives to perceive, and thus absorb and process, her experience sub specie aeternitatis, placing her action in a cosmos less inhospitable than her social world. But these defenses also contain the kind of speculation familiar from Shakespearean tragedy, where the elevated are crushed as they inaugurate new conceptual options. I think Webster here moves beyond Shakespeare, whose women are insufficiently disillusioned to face the ultimate universal hostilities. The duchess is the first fully tragic woman in Renaissance drama.
Once trapped, this woman recites a litany from Shakespearean tragic experience. Ironically courtly to the last, she exhibits a "strange disdain," refusing to grovel and reanimate the ideology she has left behind. She speaks of the thinness of daily life, feeling herself playing a part in tedious theater. She considers praying but instead curses the stars, calls down plagues on her tyrant lineage, and summons the ultimate and original chaos.28 Like Job, she refuses to acknowledge sinfulness.
Though utterly stripped like the bare, forked galley slave (4.2.28), she insists on her founding persona of power, "Duchess of Malfi still" (4.2.142).
But in reiterating her freedom's origin (in rank), she inevitably also reminds us of her deep inscription in that system, for she has no independent proper name. Webster insists that she is not Victoria, not Livia, not Lucrezia or Cordelia, but one born to be trapped in rank, however she may struggle in the destructive element.
But this irony escapes her, and departs defiant, her own deed's creature to the end. She sustains investment only in her children, the bodily fruits of the personal human love that motivated her original action. The only hierarchy she will acknowledge is a residual and absconded heavenly one, utterly unrelated to any supposed earthly representatives. Having detranscendentalized her social world, she sarcastically puts off her last merely feminine attribute, her tediousness, and bids Bosola tell her brothers they can feed in peace. She leaves Cariola behind her, briefly absent from felicity only to mark the limits of the female model her mistress has razed, by biting and scratching and screeching a false and futile claim to the relational sanctuary of engagement to a young gentleman.
II. Social Mobility
With Antonio we turn to the issue of upward mobility seen from below. Antonio and Bosola are presented as members of the new class of instrumental men, functional descendants of fifteenthcentury retainers who fought the Wars of the Roses for their masters. Under Henry vmII and Elizabeth some of these men came to major power, and many more served in lesser capacities, often as bureaucratic specialists but also as allpurpose henchmen. Wallace MacCaffrey notes that "the practice of the Elizabethan administration mingled confusedly the notion of a professional, paid public service with that of personal service to the monarch" (104). These roles interact in Antonio and Bosola-steward and spy, bureaucrat and hit man. Each feels the new obscure insecurity later to be identified and explained by reference to the cash nexus, the shift from role to job. Each feels it differently. Antonio enters the play as a choric voice, praising French courtly virtues and presenting the dramatis personae in the reified generic terms of the seventeenth-century "character." He is thus grounded in our sympathy (and distanced from the action) by his ideological and narrative spokesmanship, an apparently authorial substantiation that Webster immediately undermines by plunging him into political elevation. He loses his distancing footing at once, in part through the very virtues that entitled him to the choric role.
After the choric exposition, we hear of Antonio's first action, his victory in the joust, a traditional arena for aristocratic character contests.
But for this achievement Ferdinand has only perfunctory applause: "Our sister duchess' great master of her household? Give him the jewel:-When shall we leave this sportive action, and fall to action indeed?" (1.1.90-92). Such archaic and sanitized-that is to say, fictional-warfare bores the great duke. Mobile men like Antonio strive continually to grasp such identity as Ferdinand seems effortlessly to possess (though we know better), but they fail to extract satisfying ratification from its established possessors. This problem is more pressing-and more developed-in Bosola than in Antonio, so I will postpone full discussion of it until the next section. But it is important to see that Antonio's efforts are ill-fated from the start.
We must also see Antonio as one who, like Bosola, is a man in the way of opportunity, a man with a fortune to make. In an early conversation (1.1.224-30) the two servants are superimposed by Ferdinand and the cardinal, who consider them for a job of spying. As a relatively solid steward, Antonio occupies a more assured position than Bosola, whose tormenting search for secured identity constitutes his role in the play; perhaps for this reason Bosola is judged more apt for spying.
But they share the a priori situation of men whose identity is achieved, not ascribed, in a society where such identity has not yet been accepted as fully substantial.
As we have seen, the duchess's coercive offer animates Antonio's social insecurity. Her steward holds an achieved status of considerable power and security: the skilled estate manager was a Jacobean eminence. For Antonio has arrived at a local pinnacle, and he is satisfied to rest there in honorable service. In part because of this basic satisfaction, he fears the duchess's adventurous proposal. Despite his erotic fantasies concerning his mistress, he must be coerced into further mobility. Antonio is a "new man," his position based on new practices of personal self-determination. But his horizon of mobility is clearly circumscribed; beyond its limits he is ill at ease, unprepared for a society open to the top.29
Once he enters that turbulent realm his public behavior becomes apparently more confident and aggressive, more typical of a man on the move.
His sparring with Bosola, whose espionage he suspects from the start, takes the form of class insults. He sneers at him as an upstart, publicly adopting the attitude of the class he has secretly entered as the duchess's consort: "Saucy slave! I'll pull thee up by the roots" (2.3.36); "Are you scarce warm, and do you show your sting?" (2.3.39). In so doing, he emphasizes his own capacity to hire and fire, to make men and break them, ultimately to establish or deny their status; his sneers are combative and self-creative at once.
Such utterances are actually rooted in insecurity. "This mole does undermine me. . . . This fellow will undo me" (2.3.14, 29). But Antonio's insecurity is less remarkable than its restriction to himself; he does not consider his wife and child in his fear. Barely able to cope with the storms of courtly intrigue to which the duchess has brought him, he is "lost in amazement"(2.1.173) when she goes into labor; having presented the cover story, he mutters, "How do I play the fool with mine own danger!" (2.2.69). When he hears the threats of Ferdinand's letters, he follows his wife's instructions, however grievingly, and leaves his family to face Ferdinand's murderous rage without him. He fears for his own safety more than for theirs. To rebuke Antonio's petty self-defenses would be to miss the point. They should be recognized as unchosen responses to stresses not of his making. Antonio had filled a place where he felt secure and significant. When the duchess converts his erotic daydreams to reality, they become social nightmares. He is not prepared for life in the seismographic realm of noble intrigue. The duchess is not insolvent, for instance, as Webster might have arranged, with ample contemporary precedent, if he had desired to probe Antonio as a powerful new man of finance. Antonio is a man of regularities, not an improviser like Bosola. For this reason he is uncomfortable in his private relations with his wife, feeling bound both to the traditional hierarchy of rank, which enjoins his submission, and to the traditional gender hierarchy, which enjoins him to dominate. His culture has not prepared him to be a subordinate husband or to be a princely consort continually at risk. He is finally to be seen, and sympathized with, as a man helplessly ruled by problems arising from a superior's ambitious love. He lives uncomfortably in the courtly world that has enclosed him. Indeed, we might say, the text infects him with ambition: by the time the news of his child reaches Rome he seems ambitious even to his best friend, who fears "Antonio is betray'd. How fearfully / Shows his ambition now!" (2.4.80-81). And at his death Antonio speaks of a "quest of greatness" now his own, retrospectively apparent by its present collapse. This false dream he would spare his son, bidding him fly the courts of princes (a wish in fact ironically ungranted: the son's restoration at the play's end bodes ill for him, whatever it may say for Amalfi). Antonio's final action, the desperately naive journey to the cardinal for reconciliation, freezes him for us, as one whose unsought elevation never brought much sense of how to navigate the webs of alliance and enmity.
Like the other characters, Bosola is concerned to govern the grounding of his identity. As an employee he presents one of the most intricate examples of the Renaissance problematic of selfshaping. This representation is initially adumbrated through a dense blend of the predicates of counselor, malcontent, have-not, henchman, and aesthete, roles all marked by alienation.
Bosola enters on the heels of Antonio's normative set piece on the French court, a model of public service in which the solipsistic vanities of the decorative gentleman are given a final cause in political service to the prince. In Bosola's intensified and privatized enactment of Castiglione's courtly counselor, Webster dissects the internal might": these rays make "eche subject clearely contradictions of the life to which the nation's see, / What he is bounden for to be / To God his ambitious young men were drawn. Prince and common wealth, / His neighbour, In swift succession Bosola annexes a variety of kindred and to himselfe" (100). In this view serstances toward "courtly reward and punishment." vice was simply a mode of assent to the static fact Antonio first labels him "the only court-gall" of ascriptive rank. As Stone shows, however, (1.1.23), suggesting the standoffish or outcast mal-James's sale of honors helped to displace the content, almost a specialist Jeremiah. Yet this es-power to confer identity from God's representatimate is at once complicated further: tive to the money that bought him (Crisis 65-128 et passim). As the human origin of rank was his railing gradually revealed, it became clear that the power Is not for simple love of piety; to confer it was freely available to those who Indeed he rails at those things which he wants, could pull the strings of influence or purse. When Would be as lecherous, covetous, or proud, ascriptive status emerged as a commodity, the Bloody, or envious, as any man, king's sacred role as fount of identity began to deIf he had means to be so. (1.1.23-28) cay, and with this shift came a change in the nature of identity itself. It became visible as The distanced moralist and the envious parasite something achieved, a human product contingent coincide in uneasy dissonance. on wealth, connection, and labor. Later, when
Webster also evokes the unrewarded servant: in Marx described it theoretically, the notion could having Bosola immediately demand belated re-seem a conceptual liberation. As individuals exward from the cardinal for a suborned murder, press their life (i.e., as they "produce their means
Webster links him to the social problem of the of subsistence"), so they are. What they are, thereveteran soldier, a stranger in his own land, dis-fore, coincides with their production, both with missed from desert as well as from service. Then what they produce and with how they produce as now this figure was unprovided for, and Bosola (German Ideology 42). Here human beings create has not even the minimal fact of service to his themselves in the process of work. But in the country to cushion his return to social life. He has Renaissance, when this insight began to be visible, been a more private soldier and has taken the fall. it seemed a loss rather than a liberation. The obHe will not rise in the pub or feast his friends on ligation to found identity on one's actions seemed Saint Crispin's Day. He can only sneer bitterly at to sever the transindividual bonds that bound the his employers for their relative depravity. Still, he polity together; it left one on one's own, save for is more than a Pedringano, much more than a the new power of cash, which could buy knightPistol, for Antonio has "heard / He's very val-hoods, even titles. Marx of course clearly speciiant: this foul melancholy / Will poison all his fies this historical passage as a demolition: the goodness." So " 'Tis great pity / He should be exchange relation of capitalism, he says, "has pitithus neglected" (1.1.74-77). The most complex of lessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that Bosola's ills, however, arise not from neglect but bound man to his 'natural superiors,' and has left from employment. remaining no other nexus between man and man For Bosola is preferred, to spy on the duchess. than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payHe is made a henchman, an agent, an instrument, ment' " (Communist Manifesto 9). For Bosola, an and so suggests the complicated new problems early transitional figure, such clear formulation that arise from the status of employee. At this was not available. I think this nexus seemed to point in English history, at the beginning of him like a lifeline, weaker perhaps than Elizabeth's capitalist dominance, service was undergoing the nearly divine "rayes" but still somehow linked to momentous shift from role to job, and the ways the ontologically solid ground of the ruling in which it could ground a sense of self were aristocracy.30 In examining Bosola's "neglect,"
changing. Hitherto the prince had been seen as Webster offers us the first tragic figure whose isothe sacramental source of identity. Puttenham lation is formulated in terms of employment by specifies this relation in a poem about Elizabeth: another.
"Out of her breast as from an eye, / Issue the Bosola initially reflects this coincidence of loss rayes incessantly / Of her justice, bountie and and possibility in bitterly deploring his "misera-ble age, where only the reward / Of doing well is the doing of it" (1.1.31-32). Webster inverts the proverb (Tilley V81) to show that virtue is no longer its own reward but has become a commodity, only a means to an end. What formerly conferred a sense of absolute worth based on a collective cultural judgment has now lost its savor and is worthless unless vendible. Bosola is so far modern that he laments not the absence of the old mode but its residual presence. Still, he gets what he seems to want almost at once, within about two hundred lines, when Ferdinand says "There's gold" (1.1.246). The rest of the play examines (as Bosola dourly inquires) "what follows." For the post of intelligencer aggravates his discontent, though it frees him from the material want and shame that dominate his galley life. But such a reward is mere hire and salary; he wants more, is miserable without it. Bosola cannot be said to be merely greedy for gain, a motive that no more explains his actions than it does Ferdinand's (see 4.2.283-85). But we need to understand what more he wants.
Of course the answer is the same total selfrealization achieved by Cariola and Kent. But the personal service by which Bosola seeks this ultimate goal in fact reduces and dehumanizes him. Where Kent's desires were completely coincident with his master's ("What wouldst thou?-Service"), Ferdinand's are withheld from Bosola ("Do not you ask the reason: but be satisfied" [1.1.257]) and so cannot be adopted as purposes.31 Bosola is specifically alienated from the utility of the "intelligence" that is his labor's product, and so he creates a reified commodity and a reified self along with it. Marx formulates this action precisely.
[Alienated] labor is external to the worker. . . . it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it . . . the external character of labor for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another. Sorel's suggestion that artistic creation anticipates the way perfected work will feel in the society of the future (39, 287) . This kind of activity confers just the unity that alienated labor undercuts.
Hence, it may be argued, aestheticizing can restore a felt unity or wholeness to actions by decontextualizing them, separating them from the context that displays one's fragmentation. In focusing on the aesthetic shape of, say, a suborned act of violence or betrayal, to the exclusion of awareness of the context that marks it as suborned violation, alienated laborers can grasp a false sense of integrity by, as it were, alienating themselves from their alienation.32 Seen in this light, Bosola's aestheticizing functions as an evasion, a narcotic that lends a sense of totality while dulling awareness of its falsity. The part seems the whole, for he can devote his whole self (and so reconstitute it for the duration) to the means of the task by ignoring the opacity of its end. The apricot incident offers a specimen of this technique. Here Bosola observes the duchess's physical condition in considerable specialist detail (2.1.63-68) and applies a test for pregnancy-the typically alimentary Renaissance device of administering apricots (a laxative and thus labor stimulant).33 The trick is, he says to himself, "A pretty one" (2.1.70): Bosola watches not only the duchess but himself at work, taking pleasure in his professional prying, even setting up private dramatic ironies and sotto voce gloating for his own entertainment (see 2. 1.112, 117, 140, 145) . Lukaics offers a theoretical frame. "The specialized 'virtuoso,' the vendor of his objectified and reified faculties does not just become the [passive] [sic] observer of society; he also lapses into a contemplative attitude vis-a-vis the workings of his own objectified and reified faculties" (100). Bosola is thoroughly engaged (and thus unifyingly estranged) not only in practicing the technicalities of his craft but in appreciating his own stylistic flair.34
We can see a similar bifurcation of consciousness in the interrogation scene (in 3.2), where Bosola discovers that Antonio is the duchess's husband. To unfold it properly we must first examine Bosola's youth, which was characterized by a more ostentatiously aesthetic sense of his actions. For according to Delio, Bosola was a fantastical scholar, like such who study to know how many knots was in Hercules' club, of what colour Achilles' beard was, or whether Hector were not troubled with the toothache: he hath studied himself half blear-eyed, to know the true symmetry of Caesar's nose by a shoeing-horn; and this he did to gain the name of a speculative man. (3.3.41-47) Bosola has had the sort of university training that warped his predecessor Flamineo, gave him a sense of ambition, and fitted him for little but mobility. The Lylyan dandy's mode seems not to have worked for Bosola; instead he finally found work with the cardinal and thus found his way to the galleys. But Delio's gossip shows that the exquisitely intellectual management of reputation is to Bosola a familiar tool, cognate with spying and thuggery; he has only retreated from its more precious manifestations.35 Under Bosola's questioning, the duchess screens her liaison by accusing Antonio of peculation (yet another false financial motive). When Bosola defends him against this accusation and other criticisms from Antonio's former fellows, she replies that Antonio was basely descended. Bosola then explicitly raises the contrast between ascription and achievement that is so central to the play: "Will you make yourself a mercenary herald, / Rather to examine men's pedigrees than virtues?" (3.2.259-60 Her unequal marriage will legitimate many other sorts of deserving mobility: the unemployed graduate will find preferment, the impoverished virgin security with a rich husband. Alien Turks and Moors will flock like Othellos and Ithamores to her side in gratitude for this tolerance of heterodox origin. And this multifoliate action will be eternized by neglected poets happy to get the work. The duchess has ratified elevation by merit, and Bosola's applause betrays his own authentic experience of the dream-and of the attendant anomie, a blend of the loss of old securities and the lack of new ones.37
Many readers accept Bosola's speech as sincere; others presume it to be a ploy designed to unlock the duchess's tongue. I think it is both: his own sincere response managed in pursuit of his employer's goal. This apparent contradiction is only a particular case of Lukacs's reified employee's general deformation: "His qualities and abilities are no longer an organic part of his personality, they are things which he can 'own' or 'dispose of like the various objects of the external world" (100). Bosola exchanges his authentic emotional stance for the information his master wants. But this self-commoditizing exchange manipulation is asymmetrical, for Bosola does not easily revert to the dispassionate stance of the intelligencer.
Perhaps the plan for the false pilgrimage is a sarcasm enabling the difficult shift from intimacy to the spy report by positing a ground for an inter-mediate stage of sneering distance: he can call her a politician, a soft quilted anvil, and so forth and return to his habitual malcontent mode. But even this self-manipulation (if that is what it is) is not fully anesthetic, for when Bosola returns to his commoditized state (the obvious force of the mediate pause of "What rests, but I reveal / All to my lord?") it is with self-loathing: "0, this base quality / Of intelligencer!" (3.2.326-28). A further deflection is needed, a universal projection of the commodity model: "why, every quality i'th' world / Prefers but gain or commendation: / Now, for this act I am certain to be rais'd, / And men that paint weeds to the life are prais 'd" (3.2.328-31) . If the duchess's act was sordid, and his own no lower than any other, Bosola may sedate the sympathy he had for her, at least long enough to file his report.
I will pass more briefly by the well-known torture and murder scene, pausing only to note how it combines the predilections of Ferdinand and his agent. The motive force is of course the brother's, a fact often missed, owing perhaps to his apparent absence. Michael Warren (of the Nuffield Theatre) has suggested that Ferdinand's role in this scene might be made clear by "having Ferdinand on or above the stage, physically directing the action" (66); I would prefer to have the duke visible but inactive, frozen in his contemplative mode of alien voyeur. For his part, Bosola steeps himself in procedure, but in the process he is touched by the insistent coherence of his fellow galley slave. She does not reach for external legitimation as he has done but rests in the fact that she is, like Middleton's Beatrice-Joanna, "the deed's creature," needing no DeFlores to tell her so. And as Bosola lives the parts he plays, his dismissal of earthly values besieges his increasingly stunted goals, even as he pursues ever more grimly the aesthetic anesthesia of obsession with form.
He is finally silent throughout the strangling, returning to life (that is, jerking away from reflection to instrumentality) with the uncharacteristically brutal "Some other strangle the children" Action beyond the employer's instruction is available only to the independent human, not to the tool that cannot think for itself. When Ferdinand challenges Bosola's humanity, he speaks his own heart too, called out of alienation too late, like Bosola's. But this castigation, meant to deflect his pain, only postpones it. In "pardoning" his henchman, he schizophrenically enacts revenge and forgiveness at once. Though the reproach nourishes Bosola's developing rebellion against his reification, he cannot at first abandon his own project. He feverishly opposes legal, moral, rational, and courtly sanctions to Ferdinand's dismissal, demonstrating his service to be in all particulars deserving. This dismissal perverts justice, he says; you shall quake for it; let me know wherefore; "though I loath'd the evil, yet I lov'd / You that did counsel it; and rather sought / To appear a true servant, than an honest man" (4.2.331-33). The parallel with the duchess's defense in the boudoir is striking; here as there the arguments are incomprehensible to Ferdinand, who again burrows into the dark. And like the duchess, Bosola must face the ultimate failure of his project, for self-fashioning through employment:
I stand like one That long hath ta'en a sweet and golden dream: I am angry with myself, now that I wake off my painted honour: While with vain hopes our faculties we tire, We seem to sweat in ice and freeze in fire. Faced with this failure, Bosola seeks his ontological grounding anew in a succession of chosen actions that he sees as neither derived from another (as his service was) nor evasively contemplative: "somewhat I will speedily enact / Worth my dejection" (4.2.374-75). Personal vengeance will at least make him his own deed's creature.
(This action obscurely coalesces the dual motives of compassion for the duchess and anger over his own neglect: Ferdinand causes both sufferings.) When we next see Bosola he is accepting employment from the cardinal with ironic alacrity: "Give it me in a breath, and let me fly to't: / They that think long, small expedition win, / For musing much o'th'end, cannot begin" (5.2.118-20). Security, like virtue, rests in the doing, in the subsuming process of unalienated action itself-in the search for a vengeance that he desperately wants to be decisive, constitutive. As Bosola opens himself more and more to the sacramental powers of moral confidence to be got from the act, he turns hopefully to a traditional self-sacrificial idiom: "0 penitence, let me truly taste thy cup, / That throws men down, only to raise them up" (5.2.348-49). Though he still feels neglect and seeks advancement, he has shifted his ground to the seemingly more reliable realm of the transcendent moral order.
It can only be Webster's comment on this posture that Bosola's next action (reminiscent of Cordelia's death after Albany's "The gods defend her!") is the unwitting murder of Antonio. His short-lived transcendental stance is utterly disrupted by this monstrous error: "We are merely the stars' tennis-balls, struck and banded / Which He casts himself finally and summarily as an agent, a vicarious actor on behalf of all the victims, not least for himself, murderer and murdered at once, haunted throughout by an always pending better self, now definitively neglected. The supposed restorative of revenge has littered the stage, but the body count, though lavish, is sterile. Bosola ends by fixing our eyes on this lack, this gulf, in his final line, about "another voyage." For as Lear's undone button invokes nakedness and the heath, Bosola's departure is seaward, to the galleys, to the pathless wilderness from which he entered the play, a castaway looking for solid ground to call his own. III. Conclusion This is the burden felt by all: the shaping of the social self in the abrasive zone between emergent and residual social formations. Webster's play is what Kenneth Burke calls a magical chart, a cognitive decree that names a problematic situation and voices an attitude toward it (Philosophy of Literary Form 3-8). Webster's chart insists that the characters' urges and defining gestures are transformations of one another; that they are fundamentally constituted by, "struck and banded which way please," a net of dimly understood and contradictory social forces; and that these forces shape and limit the kind of actions we habitually regard as individually authentic and chosen (and that carry the responsibilities we associate with tragedy and villainy). Webster provides a social world that constitutes what are clearly not the transcendental subjects of traditional moral inquiry.
Fredric Jameson suggests a more political repossession:
The cultural monuments and masterworks that have survived tend necessarily to perpetuate only a single voice . . . the voice of a hegemonic class.... They cannot be properly assigned their relational place in a dialogic system without the restoration or artificial reconstruction of the voice to which they were initially opposed, a voice for the most part stifled and reduced to silence, marginalized, its own utterances scattered to the wind, or reappropriated in their turn by the hegemonic culture. (85) I believe that this play was written, at least in significant part, to dissect the actual workings of the normative ideology set before us at its beginning. Far from providing criteria for the judgment of the heterodox characters (as criticism, seduced by power as order, has often presumed), this ideological frame and those who pose and endorse it are themselves to be judged by the "heterodox."
Critics' moral judgments directed against the outcast duchess (as lustful, irresponsible, unwomanly, womanish) emanate from this ideological center; they are at one with high-minded humanist sneering at sycophants whom the center in fact invents, summons up for service and ideological approbation. I believe that Webster strives to recover such stifled voices, to bare oppositional gestures usurpingly rewritten, both then and often even now, as womanish eccentricity or base-mindedness. My analysis has sought also to reclaim Ferdinand for understanding (if not sympathy) by reading his motives as the absolutized and finally selfdestructive core of the nobility's project for dominance. Ferdinand's savage gestures strip to the skin the soothing discourse of reciprocity. To its incantations the play is addressed as a disruptive symbolic act, the reverse of Burkean Prayeras an Imprecation.
Claremont Graduate School
Claremont, California Notes 'For a summary of the debate, see Aberle et al. 2However , see Marotti's approach to this problem, esp. 486. 3As has often been observed, this account slurs the distinction between the incest taboo (on sexual relations within the group) and the injunction to exogamy (prohibiting marriage within the group). But for the purposes of this study the gap may be collapsed, given the link between prohibitions of sex and of marriage within a descent group.
If therefore the rule of exogamy is to be related to the external value of the marriage alliance . . . then the intra-group prohibition on intercourse cannot be dissociated from it. The rejection of temporary sexuality within the group is in part a reflection of the rejection of permanent sexuality, and the latter is related to the importance of establishing inter-group relations by the exchange of rights in women. (Goody 44) Concerning incest with blood relations (as in Webster) the explanations of the incest taboo and exogamy thus tend to be congruent.
41t is no surprise to find this open formulation in a pioneering study of Polynesia, a region famous (among anthropologists, anyway) for incest. This passage concludes Middleton's "A Deviant Case," which bases its strong argument for the nonuniversality of the incest taboo on Egyptian exceptions, especially in the middle class.
5Reviewers have given this book severe strictures but generally agree that Stone is reliable on the aristocracy, my subject here.
6For a detailed study of these matters, see Whigham, Ambition and Privilege.
7A confrontation between these inner and outer boundaries is present in the normative patterns of cuckoldry in Jacobean city comedy, where an older merchant with a young wife is often cuckolded by an active young gentry figure. Sexual interaction between members of different generations (as here between husband and wife) has been called "metaphorical incest" by Levi-Strauss (10)-witness our modern exclamation, "he's old enough to be her father"-so both boundaries may be entangled somehow. I address generational incest, literal and figurative, elsewhere in the larger study of which this essay is a part.
8The issues of restraint seem to be adapted from Ernest Jones's famous account of Hamlet's delay.
90n the general issue of "degree" compare Selzer, "Merit and Degree," a study that overlaps in some ways with my own.
Selzer, however, works with a reified moral concept of "degree" that addresses neither the role of the concept in the period's ideological workings nor the growing body of work in the sociology and anthropology of Renaissance culture that would ground the term in the social context to which it manifestly refers.
In fairness, Selzer deserves credit for one of only two link- A word on the status of Ferdinand's action. I take it that family relations are not static structures but activities, pursued in the mode specified by Bourdieu, who prefers "to treat kin relationships as something people make, and with which they do something . . . they are the product of strategies (conscious and unconscious) oriented towards the satisfaction of material and symbolic interests and organized by reference to a determinate set of economic and social conditions" (35-36).
Bourdieu's analysis of parallel-cousin marriage, "a sort of quasi-incest" strategically deployed (40), offers an extended test of this view (see .
At this point I should also mention Bob Hodge's interesting article on false consciousness in Webster, which covers much of the same ground this essay addresses. (Hodge's piece appeared when this study was largely complete.) I will not attempt here a point-by-point comparison of views, aside from 14This argument entirely revalues the status of Ferdinand's turbulent response to his sister's marriage as evidence of incest. It reflects similarly on the formulation that he responds as a cuckold rather than as a wounded brother (proposed by Brennan 493) . Whether these arguments are alternatives I am not sure.
15Williams points out that the term "alienation" could literally mean "insanity" (as in "alienation of the faculties") at this time (29). See also OED "alienation" 4. The common sense of alienation from God is also relevant here. Compare 19Allison observed a vague version of this balanced contrast some two decades ago. Speaking of the "self-will and erotic bent" that Ferdinand and the duchess share, he says that "obverse aspects of the same temperamental excess have brought brother and sister to catastrophe" (266).
201 think Webster meant to present us with a confusing social problem, not with an occasion for easy and moralistic response. Despite documentary arguments against widows remarrying and for the obligations of state service, it seems unlikely that the audience is supposed to find the duchess's action antisocial, hubristic, and licentious, as a certain sector of well-known criticism claims (see, for instance, Leech, Webster, Calderwood; and Peterson) . Certainly the duchess's plight is pathetic in personal terms, but I object to seeing her as deservedly punished (nonetheless, as it were), chiefly because the ideology that grounds such a judgment-Ferdinand's ideology-is the very ideology the play puts most deeply in Widows and women who were heads of households were the only women assumed to have any independence, but the polity was normally thought to exclude women of all sorts. Sir Thomas Smith categorically rejected women as subjects and citizens in the commonwealth. Women are "those whom nature hath made to keep home and to nourish their familie." A petition by Leveller women was turned away, "their being women, and many of them wives, so that the law tooke no notice of them." As little more than "men's shadows," women were subsumed under their husbands' or masters' identity. While a wife in England was accorded the rank or status of her man, she was, nonetheless, "de jure but the best of servants."
It is easy to imagine such repression stimulating rebellion. Bosola's comment on the duchess's "strange disdain" in prison may suggest such a pattern: "this restraint, / (Like English mastiffs, that grow fierce with tying) / Makes her too passionately apprehend / Those pleasures she's kept from" (4.1.12-15).
It is reductive to think of the duchess here as missing simply sexual pleasures (though Berry hears a hint of her "sexual proclivities" [113] ). I think a more general liberation is at issue: the duchess's actions should be seen not as erotic (a common male reduction of women's issues) but as political. 22Marlowe is adduced at this point by Berggren (353) . The echo of Tamburlaine's royal human footstools is striking.
23The paradoxical penetration of wilderness in search of domesticity can be deciphered by Fowler's alignment of wildness with chastity and of tameness with submission to a lover's will, in regard to Wyatt's "Whoso list to hunt." Webster's adventuress is wild in one sense at the social level (venturesome) and wild in the other sense at the erotic level (maritally chaste).
For her the real wild is the uncharted social waste she seeks to colonize and cultivate, though of course she must enter it by means anything but domestic from her brother's point of view.
24Pitt-Rivers is writing of Andalusia, but the sentiment is common in Renaissance England, as many literary widows suggest.
25See Ekeblad; see also Pitt-Rivers 47-50 and Thomas. Though all personal identity now seems thus socially constituted, the distinctive restriction of women can still be discerned in that they (and retainers like Kent) are defined in overdetermined relation-usually familial, always private-to particular people, a set much smaller than all one's associates; often the relation is to a single person, such as the husband (or king). Compare Kent's "Royal Lear, / Whom I have ever 27This particular comparison reinforces my belief that the play's machinery substitutes the duchess's outmarriage for Ferdinand's incest as the object of horror, for Webster may well have adopted the terms of the juxtaposition from Myrrha's argument for the legitimacy of incest in Ovid's Metamorphoses: "Other animals mate as they will, nor is it thought base for a heifer to endure her sire, nor for his own offspring to be a horse's mate; the goat goes in among the flocks which he has fathered, and the very birds conceive from those from whom they were conceived. Happy they who have such privilege!" (10.324-29) . This passage is the explicit source for defenses of incest or dark sexuality in Marston (The Dutch Courtesan 2.1),
Tourneur (The Atheist's Tragedy 4.3), Donne ("The Progress of the , and Massinger (The Unnatural Combat 5.2). Webster's transvaluation of the trope to specify marital purity is striking, and the vague allusion to the lilies of the field (Matt. 6.28) amplifies the effect of a relation beyond the corrupt limits of the social.
28Leech comments that "this longing for the first chaos links her with many characters in Elizabethan and Jacobean drama whose ambitions are thwarted and who would in anger overturn the hierarchies of 'degree.' " He quotes Northumberland's "let order die!" speech from Henry IV, Part 7To and suggests that "just as Shakespeare wished to make clear the nature and ultimate goal of rebellion, so here Webster shows us a woman at odds with life itself. . . . There is a grandeur in the egoism, but its implications are essentially anarchic" (John Webster 76-77). But Leech has omitted the definitive case of King Lear, and, in any event, the moral weight of rebellion depends on what is being rejected.
29 For discussions that presume Antonio to be ambitious in the wooing scene, see 30Ornstein has adumbrated this idea less technically, suggesting that Bosola "seeks to give meaning to his life by loyal service" (143).
311t is instructive to compare Macro's speech of selfdefinition as agent in Jonson's Sejanus.
have to obey the rules of those who have hired them, and lack even the satisfaction of a Lodovico in "limning" the nightpiece of The White Devil (1612)-a satisfaction that seems to survive even when the artist himself is about to be "dislimbed."
33The detail of this commentary is impressive enough that
Nordfors has described Bosola as a protoscientist. 34For more on the significance of this emphasis on style and manner, see Whigham, [88] [89] [90] [91] [92] [93] [94] [95] 35Bosola's rejection of this strategy connects with his criticism of the Old Lady (2.1.21-44) for what may be termed the conspicuous ontological repair of cosmetics and with the equally bitter mock instruction he gives Castruchio in how to "be taken for an eminent courtier" (2.1-20). The energy of these otherwise disconnected speeches may be read as selfcastigation deflected onto a sitting target; see Whigham, Am- bition and Privilege, 116-18, 223 n.40. 36The nostalgic edge of Bosola's praise ("yet"-285) can presumably be explained by reference to the resentful claim of Castiglione's Vincent Calmeta, that "now adaies very few are in favor with princes, but such as be malapert" (110). Perhaps the ambitious always fear they have been left behind without realizing it; in any case, in that world rivals are alwayscontradictorily-presumptuous, versions of the self, deserving.
